



Most legal ethicists maintain that an ethical prosecutor should pursue criminal
charges against a defendant only if the prosecutor personally believes that the
defendant is guilty. The assumption is that the obligation to "do justice"
encompasses a duty to act as supreme juror, scrutinizing the evidence against the
defendant, not merely for sufficient proof to avoid a judgment of acquittal, but for
proof that persuades the prosecutor of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt in her own mind. As supreme jurors, prosecutors act not simply as
advocates of conviction in an adversarial system but as a first and ever-present
protector of the innocent, capable at any moment of declining or dismissing
charges based on her own conclusions as a juror. Rather than resist this
description, most prosecutors embrace it, priding themselves on their nearly
unrivaled power to do justice through unreviewable compassion.
This Article challenges the prevailing assumption and argues, both
descriptively and normatively, that ethical prosecutors can be agnostic about a
defendant's guilt. As a descriptive matter, ethical prosecutors routinely pursue
charges when they are not convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. For example, few question a prosecutor's ability to pursue inconsistent
charges in the alternative, even though in such cases the prosecutor must
necessarily doubt the defendant's legal guilt on at least one of the prosecuted
charges. Similarly, prosecutors must carry doubts about the defendant's legal guilt
when they seek to apply a criminal statute to a unique factual situation using a
novel legal theory. This Article questions why an ethical prosecutor cannot also be
agnostic about the defendant's factual guilt.
As a normative matter, this Article argues that agnostic prosecutors might be
better defenders of the innocent than those who pride themselves on their roles as
supreme jurors. Commentators have only recently begun to explore the distorting
effects of a prosecutor's personal belief in guilt on her subsequent decision
making. Drawing on the cognitive science literature, this Article asks whether the
protection provided to defendants by a supreme juror requirement might be
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outweighed by the adverse affects on prosecutorial neutrality once the prosecutor's
belief in guilt is formed. As an initial matter, the prosecutor's case screening for
guilt may not be especially protective of the defendant. Because of confirmation
bias, prosecutors "testing" a hypothesis of the defendant's guilt may be likely to
search the case evidence for proof confirming that hypothesis to the detriment of
exculpatory evidence. Once the prosecutor forms a personal belief in guilt, that
belief becomes "sticky" as selective information processing, belief perseverance,
and cognitive consistency will prevent the prosecutor from revisiting her
conclusion. Tunnel vision also impairs the prosecutor's ability to identify material,
exculpatory evidence to which the defense is entitled under Brady v. Maryland, as
selective information processing will cause the prosecutor to overestimate the
strength of her case without the evidence at issue and to underestimate the
evidence's potential exculpatory value. Finally, the prosecutor's role as a first and
constant case screener may lead to cascading effects on other prosecutors, judges,
and jurors, who might be less scrutinizing for reasonable doubt because of an
assumption that charges are pursued only against the guilty.
By emphasizing the ways that personal beliefs can interfere with neutral
decision making, this Article suggests that prosecutors might best serve justice, not
as supreme jurors, but as vigilant agnostics. A call for vigilant agnosticism invites
reflection on, and potentially a transformation of, the prosecutorial culture.
With the exoneration through DNA evidence of more than 250 convicted
criminal defendants,' commentators have declared the dawn of a wrongful
convictions "movement" 2 or perhaps even a "revolution."3  In a criminal justice
system founded on the premise that "it is better that ten guilty persons escape than
that one innocent suffer," exoneration cases force us to acknowledge that we do
Know the Cases: Browse the Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/Browse-Profiles.php (last visited Sept. 15, 2010) (listing 258
exonerations since 1989); see also JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How TO MAKE IT RIGHT, at xvii (2003); Jennifer
Boemer, Student Article, In the Interest ofJustice: Granting Post-Conviction Deoxyribonucleic Acid
(DNA) Testing to Inmates, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1971, 1997-99 (2000) (discussing generally
the Innocence Project).
2 Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 CoLUM. L. REv. 55, 125 (2008) (labeling
recent efforts to prevent wrongful convictions a "movement" that "represents one of the most
significant efforts to reform our criminal procedure in decades"); Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a
Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REv. 337, 376
(2006) (referring to a potential "New Civil Rights Movement" for the wrongfully convicted); David
Feige, The Dark Side of Innocence, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 15 ("An entire
innocence movement is afoot.").
Mark A. Godsey & Thomas Pulley, The Innocence Revolution and Our "Evolving
Standards of Decency" in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 29 U. DAYTON L. REv. 265, 267 (2004);
Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573,
573 (2004).
4 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895) (quoting Blackstone as saying that "the
law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer").
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convict innocent people.' As lawyers, researchers, and policy makers try to
identify the factors that contribute to wrongful convictions, the discretionary
decisions of prosecutors have increasingly come under fire. Many scholars have
criticized a prosecutorial culture described as valuing conviction rates over truth
6
and career advancement over justice.
To improve the prosecutorial culture and decrease the likelihood of wrongful
convictions, commentators have looked to the prosecutor's unique ethical
obligation to lawyer, not with zealous advocacy, but with an aim to do justice.
Emphasizing the responsibility to do justice, scholars have called for more
stringent rules, more frequent use of disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors,
and increased sanctions for prosecutors who are found to have violated the rules. 8
They have also invoked the "do justice" ethical obligation to guide prosecutors'
charging decisions. Whereas constitutional law requires only a showing of
probable cause to justify charging a defendant, many have argued that as an ethical
matter, prosecutors should be required to apply a higher bar and must be personally
persuaded that the defendant is in fact guilty before filing charges. A prosecutor
who operates under such an obligation would serve as an initial and ongoing
supreme juror, satisfying herself as a fact finder of the defendant's guilt before
subjecting the defendant to the whims of a jury. The underlying assumption is that
a supreme juror requirement would prevent wrongful convictions because ethical
prosecutors would be less likely to issue questionable cases at the outset and more
likely to dismiss them pending trial.9
At the same time, commentators have also argued that the model prosecutor
should evaluate her cases skeptically. Professor Uviller, for example, maintained
that prosecutors should review their cases with "the mindset of the true skeptic, the
5 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523 (2005); D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically
Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 762 (2007); Richard
A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 237, 237 (declaring that "we are at the
beginning of an exciting new period of American criminal justice, one directly related to the
acknowledgment that we convict innocent people").
6 See Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal
Convictions, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 537, 541 (1996); Stanley Z. Fisher; In Search of the Virtuous
Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 204-15 (1988); Bennett L. Gershman,
The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 393, 458 (1992); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal:
Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 134-36
(2004); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors
Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 58-59 (1991).
See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1573, 1587-88;
Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an
Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 887, 889 (1998); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional
Discipline ofProsecutors, 79 N.C. L. REv. 721, 773-77 (2001).
9 See infra Part II.
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inquisitive neutral."o Similarly, Professor Gershman has written that prosecutors
"should approach the preparation of a case with a healthy skepticism."' From this
perspective, the model prosecutor is one who tests the defendant's guilt the way a
scientist might subject a hypothesis to the scientific method, supporting the
hypothesis by continuously and rigorously attempting to disprove it. The
assumption is that prosecutors can be neutral decision makers, rationally
scrutinizing their cases for potentially exculpatory evidence.
However, cognitive psychologists have established that human decision
makers are neither rational nor neutral. Instead, their decision making is
systematically and predictably distorted by cognitive biases and heuristics.
Moreover, many of these cognitive shortcuts are triggered by people's personal
beliefs. This Article examines the possibility that what I call a "supreme juror
requirement" for prosecutors might undermine the kind of vigilantly skeptical
decision making we should want to foster in prosecutors. Because a supreme juror
requirement might trigger cognitive biases in the prosecutor's decision making,
prosecutors who believe that they must be personally convinced of the defendant's
guilt might be biased in their initial case screening, their handling of plea bargains,
and their evaluation of potentially exculpatory evidence. Additionally, if jurors
and judges believe that prosecutors have already prescreened their caseloads for
innocence, they might defer to prosecutorial fact finding and perform their own
functions less rigorously under a presumption of guilt. As a consequence, a
supreme juror requirement for prosecutors may be more likely to contribute to
wrongful convictions than prevent them.
Part II sets forth the background of a supreme juror function for prosecutors.
Although no single case or rule prohibits prosecutors from charging a defendant
despite personal doubts about the defendant's guilt, most ethics scholars argue, and
many practicing prosecutors agree, that the duty to do justice requires prosecutors
to serve as a first and supreme juror who predetermines the defendant's guilt prior
to charging. Part III demonstrates that, despite a prevailing belief in a prosecutor's
supreme juror role, prosecutors routinely (and often without controversy) charge
defendants even when they are not personally persuaded of the defendant's guilt.
Part IV then explores the potential adverse consequences of a supreme juror
requirement in light of cognitive biases that are triggered by personal beliefs.
1o H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation ofDispassion in a Passionate
Pursuit, 68 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1695, 1704 (2000).





The prosecutor's well-known duty to seek justice, not simply to convict, sets
prosecutors apart from other zealous advocates. According to the Supreme Court's
oft-quoted decision in Berger v. United States, the prosecutor's responsibility
[I]s not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he
is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.12
Nevertheless, there is no clear mandate either within the Constitution or
ethical rules that requires prosecutors to refrain from prosecution when they carry
personal doubts about the defendant's guilt.
As a constitutional matter, only a showing of probable cause is required to
warrant criminal charges.13 Probable cause is an objective standard separate from
the prosecutor's personal beliefs about guilt and is not an especially demanding
standard of evidence, requiring only a fair probability of guilt.14 The ethical rules
that govern prosecutors add little to this minimal requirement. The rules that
specifically govern a prosecutor's charging decisions employ the same relatively
low probable cause standard as the Constitution." More expansive ethical rules
12 295 U.S. at 88; see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648-49 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not to tack
as many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His function is to vindicate the right of people as
expressed in the laws and give those accused of crime a fair trial.").
13 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686 (1972) (observing that the grand jury has the
"function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed").
14 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (describing probable cause as "a fair
probability"); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) ("The probable-cause standard
is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities
and depends on the totality of the circumstances."); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an
Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REv. 669, 680-81 ("Probable cause is little more than heightened
suspicion, and it is not even remotely sufficient to screen out individuals who are factually not
guilty.").
15 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2009) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case
shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause .... ); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A) (1986) ("A public prosecutor or
other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows
or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause."); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993) ("A prosecutor
should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges
when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause."); see also Green,
supra note 8, at 1588 (noting that Model.Rule 3.8(a) "adds nothing" to a prosecutor's charging
responsibilities under law); Melanie D. Wilson, Finding a Happy and Ethical Medium Between a
Prosecutor Who Believes the Defendant Didn't Do It and the Boss Who Says That He Did, 103 Nw.
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that discuss the special function of prosecutors do so only obliquely and without
specific examples to guide the implementation of the prosecutor's duty to do
justice. For example, the comments to Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct provide that the prosecutor "has the responsibility of a
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate," including "specific
obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice [and] that guilt
is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence."17  The Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and ABA standards mandate that a prosecutor's duty
"is to seek justice, not merely to convict."' 8
Some legal ethicists maintain that prosecutors can "do justice" without
personally forming an opinion about a suspect's guilt prior to pursuing charges.
Richard Uviller is most commonly cited for this view: "[W]hen the issue stands in
equipoise in his own mind, when he is honestly unable to judge where the truth of
the matter lies, I see no flaw in the conduct of the prosecutor who fairly lays the
matter before the judge or jury." 9 But Uviller's view is an outlier in both the
scholarly and professional commentary. Despite the absence of a clear
requirement that prosecutors personally believe in a defendant's guilt, most leading
legal ethicists argue that a prosecutorial duty to prejudge the defendant's guilt
arises from a combination of the applicable rules and the unique role of the
prosecutor in our adversary system. They maintain that the duty to "do justice"
encompasses a duty to act as supreme juror, scrutinizing the evidence against the
defendant, not merely for sufficient proof to avoid a judgment of acquittal, but for
proof that persuades the prosecutor of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt in her own mind. Bennett Gershman, for example, maintains that "a
responsible prosecutor should be morally certain that the defendant is guilty and
that criminal punishment is appropriate."20 Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith
U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 65, 68 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edulawreview/colloquy/2008/30/
(discussing ethical rules that apply only if the prosecuting attorney knows that probable cause is
lacking).
16 See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Are a Prosecutor's Responsibilities "Special"?,
20 CRIM. JUST., Spring 2005, at 58, 58; Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the
Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1413,1429 (2007).
"7 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2009).
18 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1986); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993).
19 H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance
from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1159 (1973); see also Fisher, supra note 6, at 230 n.144 ("The
prevailing view, at least in the world of practice, surely permits prosecutors to [charge defendants
when not personally convinced of their guilt]."); Zacharias, supra note 6, at 94 ("[P]rosecutors need
not act as judges of their witness's testimony unless they are sure the witness is falsifying facts ...
20 Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of the Charging
Discretion, 20 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 524 (1993); see also Gershman, supra note 11, at 337-38
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assert that "conscientious prosecutors do not put the destructive engine of the
criminal process into motion unless they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused is guilty." 21 Bruce Green concludes that a prosecutor's role as
"'minister of justice' . . . is generally thought to imply a 'gate-keeping' function." 22
Kenneth Melilli reasons that prosecutors fail to "serve the interests of society by
pursuing cases where the prosecutors themselves have reasonable doubts as to the
factual guilt of the defendants."23 Even Professor Uviller's view of the
permissibility of prosecutorial agnosticism has its limits. More recently, he
explained, "[t]he prosecutor should be assured to a fairly high degree of certainty
that he has the right person." 2 4
Rather than resist their role as supreme jurors, most prosecutors embrace it,
priding themselves on their nearly unrivaled power to do justice through
unreviewable compassion. As supreme jurors, prosecutors act not simply as
advocates of conviction in an adversarial system but as a first and ever-present
protector of the innocent, capable at any moment of declining or dismissing
charges based on her own conclusions.25 Like Professor Gershman, I can attest
that when I was a prosecutor, I was told, and "never questioned," that my
colleagues and I should pursue a case only when personally convinced of the
defendant's guilt.26  This was also Professor John Kaplan's experience as an
Assistant U.S. Attorney: "The great majority, if not all, of the assistants felt that it
was morally wrong to prosecute a man unless one was personally convinced of his
guilt." 2 7 An early study of prosecutorial attitudes reported that many prosecutors
(discussing a prosecutor's "duty to prejudge truth" and be "personally convinced of the defendant's
guilt").
21 MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHIcs 312 (3d ed.
2004).
22 Green, supra note 8, at 1588 (noting, however, "ample room for debate" about how certain
a prosecutor's assessment of the defendant's guilt must be to warrant prosecution); see also Bruce A.
Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 612-18 (1999).
23 Melilli, supra note 14, at 700.
24 Uviller, supra note 10, at 1703.
25 Indeed, because prosecutors have all but unreviewable power not to charge a suspect, even
when sufficient evidence of guilt exists, Austin Sarat and Conor Clarke have compared the
prosecutorial power not to prosecute to a sovereign power to exempt individuals from the valid reach
of criminal law. Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of
Sovereignty, and the Limits ofLaw, 33 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 387, 390 (2008).
26 Professor Gershman recollects,
Years ago, when I became a prosecutor, I was trained to believe that you never put
a defendant to trial unless you were personally convinced of his guilt. This was, as I
recall, the accepted ethos in our office and, I assumed, in prosecutors' offices generally. I
never questioned that precept.
Gershman, supra note 11, at 309 (footnote omitted).
27 John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REv. 174, 178
(1965).
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believed that "once an accused reaches the trial stage, his guilt has been
determined by the screening processes of the police and prosecutor." 2 8  More
recently, Professor Mosteller deemed subjective prosecutorial determinations of
guilt at least an "aspirational duty."29 In sum, whether prosecutors are legally,
ethically, or morally obligated first to make a personal determination of the
defendant's guilt may not be entirely clear, but substantial anecdotal evidence
suggests that prosecutors at least widely believe they serve as first jurors, whether
legally obligated or not.
III. THE UNCERTAIN PROSECUTOR
While prosecutors widely believe that they serve a supreme juror function and
should charge only those defendants whom they subjectively believe to be guilty,
even ethical prosecutors routinely pursue cases despite personal doubts about the
defendant's guilt. Consider, for example, the permissible prosecutorial practice of
charging lesser-included offenses. In an assault case in which the defendant struck
the victim's head against a wall, the prosecutor might charge the defendant with
two levels of assault: a more serious charge on the theory that the wall, as used,
constituted a "weapon," and also a lesser-included offense that does not require use
of a weapon. 30 If the prosecutor is firmly convinced that the wall constituted a
weapon, the charging decision would not appear to conflict with a prosecutor's
supreme juror role. A defendant who is guilty of a more serious offense is, by
definition, guilty of the lesser-included offense.31  However, suppose the
prosecutor herself is uncertain whether the wall rose to the level of a "weapon."
Because charging decisions require only probable cause, she could, without
constitutional impediment, file both the felony and misdemeanor assault charges,
leaving it to the jury to determine which offense was appropriate. Indeed, even if
the prosecutor does not believe she can prove the higher charge to a jury beyond a
28 George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U. L. REv. 98, 112 (1975);
see also Whitney North Seymour, Jr., Why Prosecutors Act Like Prosecutors, 11 REC. Ass'N B. Crry
N.Y. 302, 312-13 (1956) (noting that the charging "decision is reached only after we have satisfied
ourselves of the defendant's actual guilt").
29 Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A
Fundamental Failure to "Do Justice, " 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1369 (2007).
30 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1985) (distinguishing between simple and
aggravated assault in part based on the defendant's use of a deadly weapon). Courts have held that
walls and floors can constitute the required "weapon" for felony or aggravated assault charges
depending on the circumstances of their use. See State v. Montano, 973 P.2d 861, 862 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that a brick wall is within the definition of a "deadly weapon"); State v. Reed,
790 P.2d 551, 551 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a concrete sidewalk can be a "dangerous
weapon").
31 See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989) (applying the "elements" test to
determine whether an offense is a lesser-included offense of another, which requires that the lesser
offense's elements be "a subset of the elements of the charged offense").
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reasonable doubt, no legal or ethical standard prohibits the prosecutor from
pursuing it.32 The prosecutor might file the higher charge to gain leverage over the
defendant in plea negotiations,33 and Bordenkircher v. Hayes suggests that such
charging practices are permissible so long as the charges are supported by probable
cause.34
Prosecutors also routinely charge defendants despite uncertainties about guilt
when they accuse a defendant of multiple, inconsistent charges. Consider, for
example, a case in which police arrest the defendant as a seller in a hand-to-hand
drug transaction. After a chemical test of the powder that he sold reveals that the
substance was baking powder and not cocaine, the defendant claims that he knew
the drugs were "bunk." His statement, if credible, would make him guilty of theft
by deception. Police, however, have other evidence suggesting the defendant
believed the substance was cocaine and was himself deceived by his distributor.
Based on this evidence, the prosecutor personally believes that the defendant is
guilty only of attempted drug distribution and is not guilty of theft. Nevertheless,
following the common practice of submitting alternative theories to a jury, the
prosecutor might charge the defendant both with attempted drug distribution and
theft, submitting the charges to a jury in the alternative.
Rather than frown upon such charging decisions, courts have encouraged
them. For example, the New York Court of Appeals has held that depraved
indifference murder is not a lesser-included offense of intentional murder. Rather,
depraved indifference murder and intentional murder are inconsistent charges
because an actor cannot simultaneously have the purpose to cause death and be
indifferent to the risks of death.3 ' However, even though the charges are
inconsistent, prosecutors generally are not required to elect a theory prior to trial.
32 See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion
and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 851, 864 (1995).
3 Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36
HOFSTRA L. REv. 275, 285-86 (2007) (noting that the Model Rules do not expressly prohibit
overcharging, which may be used to gain an advantage during plea bargaining); Leslie C. Griffin, The
Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 259, 271 (2001) (observing that the ethical standards
in plea bargaining are "not very restrictive"); Meares, supra note 32, at 864-65 (discussing how plea
bargaining may influence the practice of overcharging).
34 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); see also Rachel E. Barkow,
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 869, 879 (2009) (observing that Bordenkircher grants "prosecutors the ability to exact a heavy
price on defendants who opt to take a case to trial in order to get them to plead guilty to the charge
the prosecutor believes is the appropriate one"); Tung Yin, Not a Rotten Carrot: Using Charges
Dismissed Pursuant to a Plea Agreement in Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines, 83 CALIF. L.
REV. 419, 463-64 (1995) (noting that Bordenkircher appears to permit prosecutorial overcharging).
3 People v. Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d 909, 909-10 (N.Y. 1987); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 300.30(5) (McKinney 2002) ("Two counts are 'inconsistent' when guilt of the offense charged in
one necessarily negates guilt of the offense charged in the other.").
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36Instead, charges are submitted to the jury in the alternative. Similarly, the
Supreme Court has held that when there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find
that a defendant either committed a robbery himself or subsequently received
proceeds of the robbery, both charges may be prosecuted so long as the jury is
instructed that it cannot convict the defendant of both inconsistent charges.
Whenever a prosecutor pursues inconsistent theories in the alternative, she is by
definition prosecuting the defendant for at least one charge of which the prosecutor
is not personally convinced of the defendant's guilt.
Finally, prosecutors also pursue charges without a personal belief in the
defendant's guilt when they prosecute despite uncertainties about the reach of the
criminal law. Consider, for example, the Tennessee prosecution of Wilbert
Rogers, who stabbed his victim with a butcher knife, penetrating his heart and
causing cardiac arrest. The victim was resuscitated and initially survived but
developed a condition as a result of oxygen loss to his brain. He slipped into a
coma and died fifteen months later from a kidney infection, a common
complication in comatose patients. 39  The state supreme court had long ago
recognized the common law's year-and-a-day rule, which provided that a
defendant could not be convicted of murder unless the victim died within a year
and a day of the defendant's act.4 0 Nevertheless, the state charged Rogers with
murder, arguing that the year-and-a-day rule should be judicially abolished. Given
the current state of the law, the charging attorney could not have been personally
convinced that Rogers was guilty of murder. Rather than scold the prosecutor for
charging the defendant despite doubts about his guilt, the Supreme Court affirmed
the defendant's conviction and held that the Tennessee Supreme Court's
retroactive application of its abolishment of the year-and-a-day rule violated
41
neither the Ex Post Facto Clause nor due process.
The prosecutor in Rogers was certainly not the first to proceed with criminal
charges despite doubts he must have carried about the reach of the criminal law.
Every time prosecutors apply criminal statutes to reach novel factual circumstances
beyond those that originally motivated legislative action, they necessarily must
carry doubts about the defendant's guilt under the law. Consider, for example, the
recent prosecution of Lori Drew, who created a fictitious persona in MySpace to
36 Suarez v. Byrne, 890 N.E.2d 201, 209 (N.Y. 2008); People v. Johnson, 662 N.E.2d 1066,
1066-67 (N.Y. 1996); Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 909; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.40(5)
(McKinney 2002) (regarding the submission of inconsistent counts to the jury in the alternative).
3 United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544, 550 (1976).
3 Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
' Id. at 454.
4 Percer v. State, 103 S.W. 780, 783 (Tenn. 1907); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIEs *197-98.
4' Rogers, 532 U.S. at 456-67.
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42befriend, and then criticize, one of her daughter's peers. When the duped girl
subsequently killed herself, federal prosecutors charged Drew with conspiracy and
three misdemeanor violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.43 Given this
novel application of the law, the charging prosecutors must have carried some
doubts about whether the creation of a fake MySpace profile constituted a crime.
Similarly, whatever prosecutor first invoked the theory of the "honest service
doctrine" to use the mail fraud statute to reach corruption by state public officials
also must have proceeded despite doubts about the reach of the law." Courts are
able to address the boundaries of criminal statutes in large part because prosecutors
frequently invoke creative legal theories to charge cases at the edges of a statute's
reach.
One might argue that the above examples all involve prosecutors who were
uncertain about the defendant's legal guilt as opposed to his identity as the
perpetrator. In each of my examples, the prosecutor believed that the defendant
who was charged was the person actually involved in the incident but was
uncertain whether, or to what degree, the criminal law reached the defendant's
conduct. In contrast, proponents of a supreme juror requirement might argue,
prosecutors should not proceed with charges if they are not personally persuaded
that the defendant was involved in the conduct that gave rise to the potential
charges. Advocates of this distinction would presumably argue that prosecutors do
not breach their ethical duty to "do justice" when they force a defendant to litigate
legal issues before a judge and jury, so long as the prosecutor is personally
confident that the defendant was factually involved in the incident.45 A prosecutor
fails to "do justice" only when she proceeds with charges despite doubts that she
may have the "wrong guy."
This potential distinction between legal and factual guilt strikes me as wrong,
both descriptively and normatively. As a descriptive matter, the Supreme Court's
limited jurisprudence on prosecutorial ethics suggests that a prosecutor's duty to
protect the innocent does not distinguish between legal and factual innocence.
When the Court wrote in Berger about a prosecutor's duty that "justice shall be
42 Jennifer Steinhauer, Woman Found Guilty in Web Fraud Tied to Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
27, 2008, at A25.
43 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). The jury acquitted her of conspiracy but convicted her of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act violations. The district court subsequently dismissed her
convictions. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 468 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
4 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently restricted the reach of the mail fraud statute when the
alleged object of the fraud is a deprivation of "honest services" owed by the defendant to the victims,
in part because the more expansive application endorsed by prosecutors raised vagueness concerns.
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010); see also Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct.
2963, 2966 (2010).
45 Professor Gershman has also explored the concepts of "factual truth" and "legal truth" and
concluded that a prosecutor's duty to the truth applies to both. Gershman, supra note 11, at 311 n.6.
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done,"A6 it did so not only by juxtaposing guilt and innocence 47 but also by
contrasting "hard blows" with "foul ones," suggesting that a prosecutor-as a
"servant of the law"4A-must protect not only factual innocence but also legal
fairness. Moreover, to the extent the Court has ever attempted to flesh out the
prosecutor's duty to do justice, it has done so most concretely in the area of a
prosecutor's duty to disclose material, exculpatory evidence to the defense.49 In
that context, the prosecutor's duty extends to evidence that is material, not only to
guilt or innocence, but also to the degree of punishment.o
Perhaps one might argue normatively that it is less offensive to make an
accurately identified suspect litigate the legality of his conduct than a person who
may not have been involved in the underlying conduct at all. This argument
carries some intuitive appeal. After all, from a moral perspective, an actor whose
conduct places him even at the border of criminal law is less "innocent" than a
suspect who has been wrongly identified. Whereas prosecutors should refrain
from prosecuting the latter, perhaps it is not unethical to charge the former so a
court can determine the precise reach of the law. However, the argument that
prosecutors can ethically charge defendants whom they believe may be legally
innocent, but not those whom they believe may be factually innocent, ignores
criminal law's rule of legality. Every first-year law student learns the phrase, nulla
poena sine lege: no penalty without a law.51 Without recognition of common law
crimes, America's contemporary criminal justice system criminalizes only through
legislation. Accordingly, even if a defendant has been identified accurately as the
actor involved in the incident, if the legislature has not criminalized his conduct, he
is just as innocent under the law as a defendant who was falsely accused of being
the suspect.
Any proposed distinction between legal and factual innocence also suffers
from the whiff of, "he might not be guilty of this, but he's guilty of something."
Perhaps a prosecutor who charges a defendant whom he believes may be legally
innocent could find comfort in the defendant's wrongful, albeit not necessarily
unlawful, deeds. For example, a prosecutor with personal doubts about the legal
guilt of a Lori Drew could place the blame for her charging decision on Drew, who
would not have to litigate her fate had she not created a false MySpace persona to
harass a troubled young girl. The problem with that logic is that it might also
apply to cases of factual innocence. A rape suspect might come to the attention of
police because he committed similar offenses in the past. A murder suspect may
46 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
47 Id. (explaining that a prosecutor has a "twofold aim ... that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer").
48 Id. (emphasis added).
4 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
50 See id.
51 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 88 (1895).
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have made threats against the victim. A hate-crimes suspect might distribute racist
propaganda. Even wrongly accused suspects become suspects for a reason, and the
suspects themselves often contribute to the suspicion against them. Nevertheless,
they are innocent unless they committed the crimes of which they are accused, just
as are those who are legally innocent.
In sum, despite the widespread belief that prosecutors only pursue charges
when personally persuaded of the defendant's guilt, prosecutors routinely
prosecute cases despite uncertainties about the defendant's guilt of the crimes
charged.52
IV. THE DANGERS OF PERSONAL BELIEFS
Ethics scholars who argue that prosecutors must be personally persuaded of a
defendant's guilt have done so with at least an implicit presumption that a supreme
juror requirement would protect the innocent and reduce the chances of wrongful
convictions. 53 Meanwhile, a separate emerging literature has begun to explore how
cognitive biases and heuristics can affect the discretionary decision making of
prosecutors.54 This literature has consequences for shaping the preferred ethical
rules of prosecutors. Specifically, it calls into question the desirability of a
supreme juror requirement because of the distorting effects that preexisting beliefs
can have upon neutral decision making.
This Section explores a supreme juror requirement's potentially adverse
impacts on prosecutorial decision making. As an initial matter, if prosecutors
screen cases with the goal of forming a personal belief in the defendant's guilt,
"confirmation bias" might cause them to search the case evidence for proof
confirming that hypothesis to the detriment of exculpatory evidence. Once the
prosecutor forms a personal belief in guilt, that belief becomes "sticky" as
52 See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (2009) (noting the
debate over the prosecutorial practice of charging two defendants with the same crime when only one
at most could be guilty).
53 See Gershman, supra note 20, at 521 (grounding the supreme juror requirement in a
"gatekeeper" function in which prosecutors "prevent an injustice before the system, if left to its own
devices, miscarries"); Green, supra note 8, at 1588 (describing a prosecutorial "gate-keeping"
function to protect the innocent from prosecution).
54 See generally Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel
Vision, 49 How. L.J. 475 (2006); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REv. 2463, 2496-519 (2004); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making:
Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1587 (2006); Keith A. Findley &
Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REv.
291; Medwed, supra note 6, at 140-42; Barbara O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at
the Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision
Making, 74 Mo. L. REv 999 (2009); Myrna Raeder, What Does Innocence Have to Do with It?: A
Commentary on Wrongful Convictions and Rationality, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1315, 1327-28.
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selective information processing, belief perseverance, and cognitive consistency
will prevent the prosecutor from revisiting her conclusion. Tunnel vision might
also impair the prosecutor's ability to identify material, exculpatory evidence to
which the defense is entitled under Brady v. Maryland,55 as selective information
processing will cause the prosecutor to overestimate the strength of her case
without the evidence at issue and to underestimate the evidence's potential
exculpatory value. Finally, the prosecutor's role as a first and constant supreme
juror may lead to cascading effects in other prosecutors, judges, and jurors, who
might assume that the defendant must be guilty or would not have been charged.
Because of the distorting effects of a prosecutor's personal beliefs in guilt, it is
possible that requiring such a belief might actually contribute to wrongful
convictions rather than prevent them.
A. Cognitive Bias in Initial Case Screening
Accepted scientific methodology requires testing a hypothesis by attempting
to falsify it. 56 Psychologists, however, have demonstrated that people do not apply
the scientific method to everyday decision making. Instead, they suffer from
confirmation bias, "the tendency to test a hypothesis by looking for instances that
confirm it rather than by searching for potentially falsifying instances." For
example, in a classic demonstration of confirmation bias, subjects were shown a
number series-2, 4, 6-and asked to determine the rule determining the numeric
sequence. They were then allowed to offer other triplets of numbers to test their
hypotheses. The actual rule was simple: any three ascending numbers.59 The
subjects, however, overwhelmingly generated the more complicated theory that the
sequence was comprised of multiples of two. 60 More importantly, to test that
hypothesis, they offered triplets that were consistent with their theory-8, 10, 12-
rather than inconsistent and therefore falsifying-8, 9, 12.61
s 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
56 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) ("Scientific methodology
today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this
methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry." (quoting Michael D.
Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of
Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 643, 645 (1992))); KARL R. POPPER,
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. rev. 1989)
("[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.")
(emphasis omitted).
5 D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems ofExpectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 7 (2002).
58 P. C. Wason, On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12 Q.J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 129, 130 (1960).
59 Id.




In hypothesis-testing terms, a prosecutor who believes she serves as supreme
juror will be testing her theory that the defendant is guilty. The human tendency
toward confirmation bias may lead her to search the case evidence only for
evidence that would confirm the defendant's guilt.62 She may, for example, look
only at the fact that an eyewitness identified the defendant without giving proper
weight to the failure of two other witnesses to do so. Moreover, when given the
opportunity to shape further police investigation, she might request evidence that
can only further inculpate the defendant rather than disprove the working
hypothesis of guilt.63
Researchers have increasingly identified "tunnel vision" as a contributing
factor in wrongful convictions." When police and prosecutors develop "tunnel
vision," they focus on an individual suspect and then "filter" all information
through that lens. In cognitive terms, tunnel vision is an example of confirmation
bias. Law enforcement searches for and emphasizes evidence of the suspect's guilt
because people generally search for and emphasize evidence that is consistent with
the hypothesis they are testing.66  Moreover, a supreme juror requirement only
amplifies tunnel vision by shaping the prosecutor's hypothesis. A prosecutor who
believes she must sit as supreme juror will approach a case to test the theory that
the defendant is guilty. Confirmation bias can then trigger tunnel vision,
undermining the prosecutor's ability to view her case skeptically and search for
exculpatory evidence.
62 Burke, supra note 54, at 1603.
63 See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1600 (2005) (noting that confirmation bias in police
and prosecutors can affect criminal investigations).
6 GEORGE H. RYAN, STATE OF ILLINOIS, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 20-21 (2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-report/complete-report.pdf (identifying
tunnel vision as a contributing factor in several cases in which defendants were released from death
row in Illinois); FPT HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS COMM. WORKING GROUP, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT
ON THE PREVENTION OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE, at i, 35-41 (2004) (Can.), available at
http://canada.justice.gc.caleng/dept-min/pub/pmj-pej/pmj-pej.pdf (identifying tunnel vision as one of
eight leading causes of wrongful convictions); Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About Justice from the
"Laboratory" of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer
Evidence, 70 UMKC L. REv. 847, 849-56 (2002) (examining evidence from Canada and Britain
demonstrating the role that investigative tunnel vision plays in wrongful convictions).
65 Findley & Scott, supra note 54, at 292.
66 See Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST.
J. CRiM. L. 369, 428 (2009) ("Research on the causes of wrongful convictions has produced a large
body of scholarship describing the problem of 'tunnel vision,' the unconscious cognitive biases that
plague both police and prosecutors."); Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance,
Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 899 (2008) ("[P]olice and
prosecutors-as human beings-are likely, once they have identified a suspect or formed a theory of
guilt, to seek confirming evidence and not seek disconfirming evidence.").
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B. Cognitive Bias During Litigation
Unfortunately, the cognitive picture only worsens once the prosecutor decides
to proceed with charges. Cognitive research demonstrates that people are biased
not only in how they search for information but also in how they store and process
it, recalling and analyzing information according to their existing beliefs. A
supreme juror function assures that in every case that is filed, the prosecutor has
already formed a personal belief that the defendant is guilty. That pre-existing
belief can give rise to the phenomena of selective information and belief
perseverance.
Selective information processing is the tendency of people to readily accept
information that supports their prior beliefs while devaluing contradictory
evidence. In a classic study of selective information processing, researchers
asked subjects to evaluate two studies of capital punishment, one which purported
to show that the death penalty effectively deterred crime and one purporting to
show no deterrent effect.68  From prior questioning, the researchers knew
individual subjects' views on the death penalty. Subjects who favored the death
penalty evaluated the pro-deterrence study as more persuasive while death penalty
opponents reached the opposite conclusion. 70 As a result of selective information
processing, both groups of subjects reported that their pre-existing views had been
strengthened, even though all of the subjects had reviewed studies using similar
methodologies but reporting contradictory results.7'
A separate but related phenomenon is belief perseverance. Whereas selective
information processing describes the failure to make rational, incremental
67 See generally Craig A. Anderson et al., Argument Availability as a Mediator of Social
Theory Perseverance, 3 Soc. COGNITION 235, 244-48 (1985); Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez,
Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred
Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 568 (1992); Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A
Disconfirmation Bias in the Evaluation ofArguments, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1996);
Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1231 (1984); Arthur G. Miller et al., The Attitude Polarization
Phenomenon: Role of Response Measure, Attitude Extremity, and Behavioral Consequences of
Reported Attitude Change, 64 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 561, 563-64 (1993); Geoffrey D.
Munro & Peter H. Ditto, Biased Assimilation, Attitude Polarization, and Affect in Reactions to
Stereotype-Relevant Scientific Information, 23 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 636 (1997);
Norbert Schwarz et al., Interactive Effects of Writing and Reading a Persuasive Essay on Attitude
Change and Selective Exposure, 16 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 5-9 (1980) (reporting that
subjects found sample letters to the editor more convincing and less biased when the letters supported
their own positions).
68 See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098,
2100 (1979).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 2101-02.
" Id. at 2103-04.
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adjustments to existing beliefs in response to new information, belief perseverance
describes the tendency of people to adhere to their prior beliefs even when
contradictory evidence firmly refutes them. 72 For example, in a classic display of
belief perseverance, researchers gave subjects a series of what appeared to be
suicide notes and asked them to guess which notes were genuine and which were
fake.73 Subjects were then given false feedback regarding their success at what
was actually a dummy task.74 Following the task, researchers fully debriefed the
subjects, explaining that the feedback they were given was entirely random,
predetermined, and fabricated. They even showed subjects the experimenter's
instruction sheets as proof that subjects were randomly assigned to their respective
success rates.76 Nevertheless, when subjects were subsequently asked how well
they thought they would fare at performing the actual task of discerning between
genuine and fake suicide notes, they demonstrated considerable belief
perseverance. Subjects who had been told previously (and falsely) that they were
successful at the task evaluated their hypothesized performance more highly than
those who had been told that they were unsuccessful.77
A supreme juror requirement forces prosecutors to commit to a personal belief
in the defendant's guilt early in the process when charges are initially filed.
Because of selective information processing, the prosecutors' evaluation of
additional evidence will be skewed toward further inculpation of the defendant,
and the initial belief in guilt will be "sticky.,78 New evidence that appears to
strengthen the prosecutor's case will be accepted at face value. Even if evidence is
ambiguous, the prosecutor will interpret it through a lens of guilt. Potentially
exculpatory evidence, on the other hand, might be viewed as unreliable, mistaken,
or irrelevant so as not to undermine the prosecutor's existing belief.79 Indeed, even
if the exculpatory evidence proves that the defendant is innocent, belief
perseverance might lead the prosecutor to continue to adhere to her initial belief in
guilt.
72 See generally Craig A. Anderson et al., Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of
Explanation in the Persistence ofDiscredited Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1037
(1980); Lee Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional
Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 880 (1975).
7 See Ross et al., supra note 72, at 882.
74 id.
71 Id. at 883.
76 id
7 Id at 883-84.
78 Burke, supra note 54, at 1605-06.
79 See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 917, 945-46 (1999) (noting that prosecutors
believed they "get wedded to their theory and things inconsistent with their theory are ignored").
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The prosecutor's personal belief that the defendant is guilty might also
interfere with her ability to comply with her disclosure obligations to the defense.
Under Brady v. Maryland, prosecutors are required by due process to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense, but only if it is material.80  Evidence is
material "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."81
A reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."82 Although a court need not determine that the evidence, if disclosed,
probably would have changed the trial's outcome, evidence is material only if it
"could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict."83
Because of the materiality standard, a prosecutor determining whether a given
piece of evidence falls under her Brady obligation is supposed to imagine the
"whole case"-even though it has not yet been tried-and then ask whether the
potential exculpatory value of the evidence is sufficient to undermine confidence
in a conviction obtained without the evidence's disclosure." Consider the ways
that the materiality standard interacts with cognitive biases in a prosecutor who
personally believes that the defendant is guilty: The evaluation of the whole case
will be through a lens of guilt, while evidence contradicting the defendant's guilt
might be cast aside as unreliable, mistaken, or irrelevant. As a consequence of
cognitive biases, the prosecutor might over evaluate the strength of her case and
undervalue the potential significance of exculpatory evidence. In short, she might
underestimate materiality and therefore be less likely to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defense.
80 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
8' United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
82 Id.
83 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,435 (1995).
8 See John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 471 (2001) ("It seems curious, to say the least, that a prosecutor has
a constitutional obligation before trial to disclose a category of information that cannot be defined
until after trial."); Findley & Scott, supra note 54, at 352 ("[T]he Brady test oddly imposes a
retrospective analysis on decisions that must be made prospectively, pretrial."); Scott E. Sundby,
Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L.
REv. 643, 658 (2002) (maintaining that Brady results in "a somewhat odd and circular spectacle: a
pre-trial obligation that is defined through speculation on a post-trial result").
85 See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1317, 1375 (1997) (arguing that a prosecutor who believes
a defendant is guilty may view potentially exculpatory evidence "as a 'red herring' with which
defense counsel may make mischief").
86 Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 494-96 (2009)
(exploring the ways that Brady's material standard invites cognitive error); Susan S. Kuo & C.W.
Taylor, In Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for Illinois Disclosure, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 695, 706-
07 (2007) ("The quest for success can affect a prosecutor's ability to objectively weigh the
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The notion of prosecutors as supreme jurors can also result in a "conviction
psychology."87 As a prosecutor, I once cheerfully announced to a defense attorney
friend that if the system were working properly, I should win all of my cases and
she should always lose. Perhaps I only said it at the time to earn her ire, but I
recall being sincere in my belief. And, as hard as it is for me to contemplate now,
my belief must have resulted from a firm conviction that prosecutors not only
served as supreme jurors but did so without error. Because prosecutors believe
they have pre-screened for innocence, they assume every defendant facing charges
must be guilty.88
C. Cognitive Bias Post-Conviction
A prosecutor's personal belief that the defendant is guilty can also continue to
interfere with neutral decision making after the defendant has been convicted. If
anything, the prosecutor's ability to revisit her belief in guilt will only be more
difficult post-conviction. The jury's verdict will be viewed as reinforcement of the
prosecutor's initial belief, strengthening her resolve.89  In newspaper articles
reporting the growing number of cases in which DNA evidence has exonerated
defendants post-conviction, it is not unusual to find quotes from prosecuting
attorneys who continue to insist that the defendant may nevertheless have been
involved in the crime. 90 Tunnel vision, selective information processing, and
materiality of potentially exculpatory evidence, a phenomenon referred to as 'tunnel vision' or
'confirmatory bias."').
8 Felkenes, supra note 28, at 110-12 (describing the "conviction psychology" that exists
among prosecutors who believe that the initial case-screening process "effectively eliminates" the
innocent from their caseloads).
ss Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRJM. L. BULL. 550, 554
(1987) ("Instead of being an agnostic on guilt, the prosecutor naturally assumes that defendants are
guilty.").
89 See Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 512, 519 (2007) ("[P]rosecutors are likely to see the end results as validation of their
initial theories of guilt."); Findley & Scott, supra note 54, at 330 ("Trials confirm those judgments
about guilt because the vast majority of trials result in convictions."); Medwed, supra note 6, at 142-
43 ("When a jury verdict validates this form of 'pre-conviction' of the defendant, it may become
extremely difficult ever to establish the defendant's innocence in the eyes of the prosecuting lawyer."
(footnote omitted)).
90 See, e.g., Maria Glod, DNA Not Enough to Charge Va. Rapist: Authorities Kept Identity a
Secret, WASH. PosT, Mar. 11, 2004, at B4 (quoting prosecutor as saying that he "cannot rule out" the
exonerated defendant as a suspect); Bruce Lambert, Prosecutor Will Retry Man Freed by DNA in LI.
Rape-Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, at B5 (announcing prosecutor's decision to retry released
defendant based on his retracted confession); Sara Rimer, DNA Testing in Rape Cases Frees Prisoner
After 15 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at A12 (quoting prosecutor as insisting that there is "no
reason to doubt the validity of [the defendant's] confession" but there is not "sufficient evidence to
convict him beyond a reasonable doubt, and in this business a tie goes to the defendant").
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belief perseverance can all contribute to prosecutorial resistance to post-conviction
claims of innocence.91
The prosecutor's role as supreme juror can also give rise to cognitive
dissonance effects. Psychologists have demonstrated the human tendency to
process information to mitigate dissonance between a person's conduct and
beliefs.92 A post-conviction claim of innocence, if true, would force the prosecutor
to concede that she had failed in her screening obligations as supreme juror. To
reconcile her conduct of charging the defendant with her beliefs that she is an
ethical prosecutor, she might explain away exonerating evidence so she can cling
to her initial theory of guilt.93
D. Creating a Presumption of Guilt in Others
Finally, the notion of the charging prosecutor as a supreme juror can also
create decisional biases in other actors. If other actors in the criminal justice
system believe that the initial charging prosecutor has screened the case for
evidence of innocence and concluded that the defendant is guilty, they may be less
independent in their own evaluations of the evidence. Analysts in the crime lab,
for example, might be biased in their interpretation of ambiguous evidence because
they assume that the defendant would not have been charged unless he were
guilty.94 In many prosecutors' offices, initial charging decisions are made by
different attorneys than the prosecutors who are responsible for case management
and trial.95 In such an arrangement, the assigned trial prosecutor might feel
91 See Burke, supra note 54, at 1605-07; Felkenes, supra note 28, at 112-13 ("Once a
defendant has been 'pre-convicted' by the prosecutor, it becomes very difficult for the accused to
establish his innocence in the eyes of the prosecutor.").
92 See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); Leon Festinger &
James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 203, 203-04 (1959).
9 Bandes, supra note 54, at 491 ("It is difficult to admit mistakes, and certainly difficult for a
prosecutor to accept that her actions have led to the conviction of an innocent person."); Burke, supra
note 54, at 1612-13 (explaining how the prosecutor's belief in a defendant's guilt becomes "stickier"
post-conviction because of cognitive dissonance effects); Findley & Scott, supra note 54, at 316
("[C]ognitive biases help explain what went wrong in many wrongful conviction cases. . . ."); Bruce
A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of
Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 489 (2009) ("If anything, these tendencies have an even
greater impact following a conviction, given the psychological difficulty of acknowledging one's
possible role in convicting an innocent person."); Jonakait, supra note 88, at 551 ("The honorable
prosecutor simply cannot believe that he is prosecuting the blameless."); Medwed, supra note 6, at
140-41 (listing psychological resistance to the idea that the wrong person was convicted among
various reasons prosecutors oppose post-conviction claims of innocence).
9 Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REv. 475, 496-97 (2006)
(discussing pro-prosecution bias in forensics analysts).
In a "horizontal" model of prosecution, different attorneys handle charging and trial
functions, whereas a "vertical" prosecution model entrusts the entirety of a case to a single
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wedded to the initial charging lawyer's decision. Judges and jurors might also be
less scrutinizing of the government's case if they believe that the prosecutor would
not be pursuing charges unless personally convinced of the defendant's guilt.96
V. CONCLUSION
This Article pursues both modest and ambitious goals. Modestly, it explores
the potential adverse effects of requiring prosecutors to form a personal belief in a
suspect's guilt prior to pursuing charges. A supreme juror function is intended to
protect the innocent, but the prosecutor's personal belief, once formed, might
subsequently distort decision making in ways that can contribute to wrongful
convictions. Because of her previous determination of guilt, the prosecutor may
undervalue potentially exculpatory evidence and underestimate legitimate claims
of innocence. Moreover, other decision makers may be less diligent in their own
screening functions if they unconsciously defer to the prosecutor's personal
determination of guilt.
More ambitiously, this Article's reconsideration of a supreme juror
requirement calls upon prosecutors to reconsider how they can best serve their dual
roles of punishing guilt and protecting innocence. Prosecutors take pride in their
supreme juror function, finding the honor of the job in their power to charge, or not
to charge, based on their personal determination of what is right.97 However, the
claim that prosecutors pursue charges only when they are personally persuaded of
the defendant's guilt is largely mythical. Being transparent about that fact might
enable not only prosecutors, but also other actors in the criminal justice system, to
mitigate bias in their decision making, leading to greater protection of the innocent
and reducing wrongful convictions.
By emphasizing the ways that personal beliefs can interfere with neutral
decision making, this Article suggests that prosecutors might best serve justice, not
as supreme jurors, but as vigilant agnostics. Unlike a supreme juror, a vigilantly
agnostic prosecutor would resist the temptation to form a personal opinion about
the suspect's guilt, neutrally evaluate both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence,
prosecutor. Mdximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform ofProsecutorial
Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRiM. L. 223, 296 (2006). Although
horizontal prosecution at least involves additional lawyers in the prosecutorial process, those lawyers
might not assess the case independently if they believe the initial charging lawyer has already
screened for innocence.
96 Cf Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive
Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, I Am. L. & ECON. REV. 158 (1999) (discussing bounded
rationality in judges); Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105
MICH. L. REv. 241, 292-94 (2006) (discussing confirmation bias in jurors); Eric Talley, Precedential
Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CALIF. L. REv. 87 (1999) (discussing bounded rationality in judicial
decision making).
97 Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ.
L. REV. 183, 186-88 (2007) (discussing "prosecutorial passion").
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and remain open-minded even in the face of overwhelming evidence. She would
screen a case for signs of innocence, not just at the initial charging decision, but at
every stage of the process, asking herself how evidence might be construed, not
just by her, but by a "true skeptic" and "inquisitive neutral."08 A call for vigilant
agnosticism invites reflection on, and potentially a transformation of, the
prosecutorial culture.
98 Uviller, supra note 10, at 1704.
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